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

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MARRIAGE INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA

By L. A. Krishna Iyer

Marriage is nothing more than a more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the act of propagation till after the birth of an off-spring. Dr. Rosenthal says that neither the duration of marriage nor the birth of a progeny constitutes wedlock. Marriage, according to Havelock Ellis, is a union prompted by mutual love and is a method of propagating the race. Marriage, says Ellen Key, signifies the living together of two people of different sexes upon the ground of love and the parent-hood of children. Speaking generally, marriage is the source of the family, the safeguard of private and public morals and the strength of the nation. There are every where three motives which lead to marriage, mutual sympathy, the desire for progeny and the necessity for mutual aid in the struggle for existence. Primitive marriage was dictated by the inexorable population need. We may assume that marriage grew out of the family rather than the family out of marriage.

Primitive Promiscuity

It was conceived by Bachofen that the first human society lived in promiscuous intercourse. Lewis Morgan thought that

man had started out like many of the animals in promiscuity, then had developed a group marriage, in which a number of men were husbands of a number of women. This in turn was presumed to have given place to plurality of husbands, polyandry, which was followed by a plurality of wives, polygamy, the final stage being that of monogamy which prevails in the higher civilisation. For a time it was thought certain Australian tribes practised occassionally promiscuity which Morgan had surmised to be the original condition of mankind. The Book of History claims that the Chinese once lived in promiscuity, knowing their mothers, but not their fathers. Ivan Block says that an original state resembling promiscuity can be assumed *apriori.* When he and others speak of early marriage, they are apt to overlook the fact that a wife is not only a cause of sexual pleasure, but a help-mate, food-provider, cook and a mother of children.

Westermarck originally opposed the view that the human race must have originally lived in a state of promiscuity, where individual marriage did not exist, where all the men in the horde or tribe had indiscriminately access to all the women, and where the children born of the union belonged to the community at large. The main evidence in support of the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity flows from two sources: Notices of ancient and modern writers about people who are alleged to live or to have lived promiscuously. Some are misrepresentations of theorists in which sexual laxity, frequency of separation, polyandry, group marriage or absence of a marriage ceremony similar to our own is confounded with promiscuity. That there is no known savage people nowadays is or recently was living in such a state is quite obvious; and this greatly discredits the supposition that promiscuity prevailed among many of the peoples mentioned by classical writers. Westermarck concludes that none of them justifies the assumption that promiscuity has been the prevailing form of sexual relations among a single people. Darwin remarks that promiscuous intercourse is utterly unlikely to prevail in a state of nature.

The almost universally accepted idea was that the primitive state of mankind was one of primal virtue and moral perfection.

Anthropological evidences in India lend themselves to different interpretations. Sir Edward Gait says: "On the other hand, most of the aboriginal tribes, both Dravidian and Mongolian, in the lowest castes of Cashmere and the Punjab hills, and the various low country castes in the United Provinces, Central Provinces, and Southern India allow the utmost freedom between the sexes prior to marriage." Sir William Crooke also says that, with most of the wild tribes, it is, in fact, a rule that although prenuptial intercourse is lightly regarded, misconduct with a member of another tribe involves excommunication. Darwin and Spencer declared the improbability of intercourse being ever free, since the passion of jealousy is so strong that it cannot be supposed to be dormant in primitive societies. Briffault says that in India it may be said that, wherever the practice of infant marriage has not been adopted, sexual relations between the unmarried are either openly or tacitly recognised. In Burma, prenuptial freedom is unrestricted in uncultured northern tribes. He however admits that the aboriginal races of South India differ from those of Northern India in that they marry earlier. Consequently, prenuptial intercourse is not so apparent as in the northern aboriginal races who marry in adult age. Researches in Travancore go to show that there is not a single tribe in which prenuptial intercourse between the sexes is permitted. Some of the tribes like the Muthuvans, the Mannans and the Kanikkar go to the extent of taking special precautions to prevent such intercourse. They keep separate dormitories where unmarried young women sleep at night under the surveillance of an elderly woman.

FORMS OF MARRIAGE

Marriage by capture. The form of marriage varied from time to time and from society to society. The earliest form of marriage is marriage by capture. A relic of this custom is found among the Muthuvans and Mannans of Travancore. A peculiar practice among the Muthuvans is that, after the marriage is settled, the bridegroom takes away the maiden from the mother's home, when she goes out for water or firewood, and lives with her separate for a few days in some secluded part of the forest. They then return

home unless they are in the meanwhile searched for and brought back by their relatives. Among the Mannans also it sometimes happens that woman, if she refuses to return the love of a man, is forcibly taken away by him. They then live together in the forest for ten or twelve days and are searched for and taken to the hamlet. The offence is generally condoned and they are allowed to live as husband and wife. Marriage by capture is also found among the Malayalis of North Arcot, the Mullkurumban of Wynad, and the Gonds of Central India.

Among a number of tribes such a seizure of the bride may be enacted with more or less realism. It may well be that in one or two parts of the world conditions arose favouring the practice of literal wife capture but it does not follow that every analogy to seizure of the bride is a survival of such a custom. One objection to the probable universality of wife capture is that marriage is always between individuals in the divisions of the tribe living in peace and harmony and are agreed to in advance. Nowhere does it seem to be a universal custom.

Marriage by service is an earlier form of marriage by purchase. It is prevalent among the Paliyans and Mannans of Travancore. Among them the bridegroom lives with his future father-in-law for six months to one year, and renders service to him before the marriage is consummated. The same custom is found among the Esquimo, the North American tribes, and the Siberian peoples; among the Ainos of Japan, in New Britain, and in many African peoples; it is a substitute for marriage by purchase where the purchaser is too poor to pay the bride's price. The practice of serving for a wife is no doubt in a large measure due to the unwillingness of the father to give his daughter in marriage for nothing. The period of service may be intended to test the young man's ability to work and show whether he is an acceptable husband and son-in-law. The bride's father gives his assent to the marriage only after the bridegroom has stood the service well.

Marriage by Purchase is the recognised form of marriage not only among the least civilised races, but also among peoples who

have reached the higher degree of culture. The bride's price which is generally given to the father goes either wholly or partly to meet the expenses of the marriage. It is found among the Malavētans, the Malankuravans, the Thantapulayas, and the Malapulayas of Travancore. A portion of it goes to the mother and maternal uncle and aunt among the Thantapulayas. Sometimes marriage by purchase may not be really so, for the bridal gift may be an expression of goodwill or ability to keep a wife and may serve among the Malavētans and Malankuravans as a protection to the wife against ill-treatment and to the husband against the misbehaviour on the part of the wife.

The bridal purchase is considered to be the most honourable form of marriage by the Crow and the Dakota. A man pays only for a comptent-bride of good character, and unions of this sort are regarded as more stable than mere lone marriages.

There is the view that wife purchase degrades women to the level of chattel. "It reimburses the women's family for the loss of her services, and makes it possible for them to replace her by another marriage."

Marriage by exchange of sisters is found among the Ullātans, the Vishavans, and the Malapantarams. No man can have a wife unless he has a sister whom he can give in exchange. A man cannot purchase a wife from her parents by giving the equivalent in property or kind. The age of the girl to be given in exchange is of no consideration. Any Ūrāli who has no sister to marry in exchange has to lead a life of single blessedness. This custom prevails among the Madigas, the Bhotiyas of Almora, some tribes in Beluchistan, and other low castes of the Madras Presidency. This was a favourite method in Australia and Melanesia.

Marriage of Brother and Sister. Another form of marriage of relatives is that of brother and sister. This was a custom of royal families of antiquity in Egypt, Persia and Peru, and it still exists or has existed in recent times in the Hawaiian Islands where it is also limited to royal families, or to the class of chiefs.

Cousin Marriage. The marriage of cross-cousins is characteristic of most of the tribes of Travancore. It appears to orginate from the simplest of economic motives, the wish and necessity to pay for a woman in kind. Formerly, the match between brother's daughter and sister's son was most common. This is said to be a survival of the matriarchate, when a man's sister's son was his heir. Marriage between a man and the daughter of his maternal uncle is prevalent among the Muthuvans, the Mannans, and the Malankuravans. But marriage with the daughter of his father's sister is prohibited. Marriage between ortho-cousins is tabooed. Among the above mentioned tribes as well as among the Malapantarams, the Malavētans, and the Malayarayans, a father desires and claims the marriage of his son with his sister's daughter. According to Briffault, the idea of distance and ignorance of the tribe in other localities with whom they can enter into conjugal relations may be another reason. In his opinion girls are never given in marriage to young men in distant places. This is the case among the tribes of Travancore. Cross-cousin marriage not only keeps the families together but also prevents disposal of property. In a society where inheritance runs through females, a father wishes to provide his son, and generally marries him to his sister's daughter. Outside Travancore, this custom is found among the Irulas, the Kuruban and others. South India turns out to be the centre where the custom attains its highest development. It has been fully described for the Todas and the Veddas. The custom flourishes in several of the Melanesian Islands.

Monogamy

The matting of one man with one woman for a more or less extended period seems to have been the most common type of marriage as far back as we can trace man. Monogamy constitutes the simplest grouping of parents and children and has a high degree of mobility and adaptability. It facilitates the exclusivenss so often sought when mates find complete satisfaction in each other. It is said that socially enforced monogamy is very rare among the primitives, but that voluntary monogamy, whether from poverty or personal choice has been the commonest form of marriage on the face of the earth.

Monogamy has its human origin in the poor. Chastity in woman has always been esteemed as a virtue by man and monogamy has always been a desideratum. Most of the hill-tribes of Travancore are monogamous, and the family is regarded as the corner-stone of society. Weddings take place at night among the Malayarayans, the Malapulayas, the Muthuvans, the Mannans, the Paliyans, and the Malapantarams. Sight is the method of contagion in primitive science and the idea coincides with the physiological aversion to see dangerous things and with sexual shyness and timidity. This custom is said to be due to a desire to protect the bride and bridegroom against dangers from above. Westermarck maintains that monogamy is the only form that has always been permitted.

POLYGAMY

Polygamy has been universally permitted among primitive people. It marks the end of primitive equality and the disappearance of clan distinctions. It develops in a society where private property is an institution. The practice of a person being married to more than one partner is usually known as polygamy. To avoid confusion, the marriage of one man with several women will be termed polygamy. Sororal polygamy, the marriage of one man to several sisters, was a common type. Its virtue was supposed to be in the fact that sisters would be more likely to live in harmony than would strangers.

The part of the world where polygamy flourishes with the greatest luxuriance is Africa, where kings and chiefs may have even hundreds of wives. The king of Ashanti is said to have had an many as 3333 wives. It is prevalent among the Muthuvans, the Paliyans, the Kanikkar, the Malayarayans, the Malapulayas, and the Pulayas Travancore. Among the Western Pulayas, it is said that before a Pulaya dies he says, "*Oralum Olakkayum Elayakudiyum Marumakanu.*" By this declaration the nephew of the Pulaya inherits the mortar and pestle and the youngest wife of

his uncle. He keeps his aunt as his wife. Among the Garos, it is said that the *nokrong*, who is usually his sister's son, comes to live in his house as the husband of one of his daughters, and when he dies, marries also his widow. Polygamy is widely prevalent among the Ūrālis among whom marriage is by exchange of sisters. Formerly, a Ūrāli married as many women as he had sisters. The result is unequal distribution of women as wives between the males of the community, the old men having more than the young, who had to go without any. Only those who can afford will go in for the luxury of having more than a wife. According to Westermarck, one factor which influences the form of marriage is the numerical proportion of available males and females. Whenever there is a marked or more or less permanent majority of marriageable women in a savage state, polygamy is allowed. At the lower stages of civilisation, every man endeavours to marry when he has reached puberty and practically every woman gets married. Polygamy is neither due to masculine lust nor is it degrading to women.

Some of the reasons for the wide prevalence of polygamy are as follows:—

(*a*) Among primitives, women are as much prized for the work they do as for their companionship The economic value of a wife is a constant source of comfort and well being. Where the wife is the chief producer, the taking of a second wife often means an increase of income.

(*b*) A man's prestige is measured by the number of wives he has.

(*c*) An excess of females, due to hazards of war, the chase, etc. invites polygamy. Indeed in certain European countries after the First World War, there were serious proposals to legitimize polygamy, because of such a preponderance of women over men.

(*d*) Man's powerful sex urge favours polygamy.

(*e*) The desire for offspring may account for a man's taking a second wife, if the first wife be barren.

The extent of polygamy is influenced by the type of economy under which men lived. It could not flourish in the hunting and fishing stage where it required considerable vigilance and activity to support adequately even one wife, but would come into its own in the pastoral and agricultural stage where a more dependable food supply was assured. It is essential to remember that, among any tribe, it was of necessity practiced by the minority rather than the majority.

POLYANDRY

Polyandry was known to ancient Sparta, and at present exists to some extent among certain Esquimo tribes, among the Wahuma of East Africa, in Ceylon, Assam, and a few other places. The best known examples are the Tibetians, the Nayars of the Malabar Coast, and the Todas of the Nilgiris, and what little study polyandry received has been mostly among these three peoples. Polyandry is less frequent than polygamy. Two forms may be distinguished, that in which several husbands of one woman are brothers and that in which they are not related to one another. Since the first one occurs in Tibet, it is called Tibetan Polyandry by McLennan. It is now usual to call it fraternal polyandry. The second one is called Nayar polyandry. The best known example is the Nayar of Malabar; it is called non-fraternal polyandry.

According to Westermarck, polyandry depends a great deal on the proportion between the male and female population, and polygamy where women constitute the majority in countries unaffected by European civilisation. It is said that where food is abundant, females exceed males; where food is scarce, males exceed females. This is true of the Malapulayas, the Ūrālis, the Malayarayans, and the Paliyans of Travancore, among whom there are more males than females owing to scarcity of food. The matriarchal type of polyandry is found among the Karavazhi Pulayas, Plateau Muthuvans, and the Mannans of Travancore. Fraternal polyandry prevails among the Malayarayan, the Ullātan, the Ūrāli, the Southern Pulayas, and the Parayas of Travancore, and among the Santals, the Bhuiyas, the Kandhs, the Oraons, and the Korkus of

Central India. Among the Todas, the husbands are nearly always brothers according to Rivers. In fact, when a man marries a woman, she becomes the wife of the younger brothers also. It existed among the Kurumbas and the Badagas. Mateer observed that the Ūrālis practised polyandry like the Todas. It prevails among the Kammalans. Among the Kallans of Madura, a woman is said to be the wife of 2, 6, 8 or 10 husbands who are all regarded as fathers of the children. Again, among the Vellalas (Kavundans) of the Coimbatore district, the Reddis of Tinnevelly, the Badagas, the Malayalis and others. it has been the common practice for the father of a family to marry for his younger son in his nonage a grown up girl with a view to be in sexual union with her.

Rockhill was frequently told by Tibetans that polyandry was frequently practised among the poor and scorned by the wealthy who were either monogamous or polygamous. Turner reported that it was frequently found even among the wealthiest families. Rockhill asserts that polyandry exists only among the agriculturists and is not known among the nomads. In Eastern Tibet where several husbands share a common wife, each lives with her for a month or more at a time, and in some section of the Punjab, the husbands have a regular rotation of rights regarding the wife. Among the Tibetans, the man chooses the wife, but among the Nayars who practise matri-local residence, the woman chooses her own husbands and they come in turn to live with her along with her mother and brothers. Usually in fraternal polyandry the eldest brother is considered to be the principal husband, and his authority is supreme or nearly so.

The causes of polyandry are as given below :

Scarcity of females. It is obvious that a considerable excess of males over females is favourable to polyandry. It is stated that in Ladakh, where polyandry flourishes, the females actually outnumber the males. Since polyandry can occur where there is no excess of males and does not occur in the majority of cases where there is an excess of males, the scarcity of woman cannot be given as its fundamental cause.

Poverty: Summer thinks that among the Tibetans polyandry is due to poverty and a hard habitat. Lowie cites the same reason for the Wahuma. The polyandrous Nayars are certainly not a poverty stricken people and it has been already shown that polyandry exists in some wealthy families in Tibet.

Group Marriage: A Natural Phase. Briffault is convinced that polyandry is not a separate and distinct type of marriage but merely a phase of group marriage from which common root either polygamy or polyandry sprouts. Parts of Tibet, claims Briffault, not only were matriarchally organised, but were under a system of gynecocracy. Sororal polygamy is the basic relationship out of which polyandry grows. In spite of the evidence presented by other writers, Briffault declares non-fraternal polyandiy to be non-existent at present, and to have been at an earlier time. He insists that Nayar polyandry, commonly accepted as non-fraternal, is strictly fraternal at heart and that any apparent deviation is not general or of spontaneous origin. He says that it is a manifestation of traditional organization, and not of local conditions.

It seems entirely true that in some sections where polyandry is common, it is not by any means the only form of marriage which is in use, but it has been already indicated that the same is true of polygamy, and frequently of monogamy, as well. There is no doubt that monogamy, polygamy, and even group marriage can be found side by side with polyandry. The Todas also have monogamy, polygamy, polyandry, and group marriage existing side by side. Rivers says, " It seems to be that the correct way of describing the present situation of Toda society is to say that polyandry is as prevalent as ever, but that owing to the greater number of women, it is becoming associated with polygamy. When there are two brothers, it does not seem that each takes a wife for himself, but rather that they take two wives in common."

There seems to be no more evidence that polyandry grows out of group marriage, merely because it can be found side by side with it, than that marriage grows out of a combination of polygamy and polyandry when these two happen to exist side by side.

GROUP MARRIAGE

Group Marriage is the form of marriage in which every male member of a generation of one group is the husband of every female of the corresponding generation of the other group, and in which the children are regarded as children of the group, and not of any individual parent. Westermarck considers the group marriage found side by side with polyandry to be the only genuine group marriage in existence. Rivers, Lowie, and others avoid the term group marriage, though Lowie thinks sexual communion just as inaccurate. It is said to have been observed among central Australian tribes. Spencer and Gillen say, "In the Urabunna tribe a group of men actually do have continually and as a normal condition, marital relations with a group of women. This has nothing to do with polygamy, and it is simply a question of a group of men and a group of women who may lawfully have what we may call marital relations. There is nothing whatsoever abnormal about it, and in all probability, this system of what is called group marriage, serving as it does to bind more or less closely together groups of individuals who are mutually interested in one another's welfare, has been one of the most powerful agents in the early stages of the upward development of the human race." Westermarck thinks of group marriage as the residuary legatee of the old theory of promiscuity.

Something approximating group marriage has also been developed among the Todas in recent times. This tribe formerly practised polyandry, the number of women being kept down by female infanticide. Under the British rule, infanticide was discouraged, the number of women increased, but the attitude towards the sharing of the wife has remained so strong that a group of brothers now take two or more women as common wives instead of taking one wife as formerly. However, the fact remains that group marriage is very rare.

Dr. Briffault writes that the regulation of collective sexual relations between given groups has everywhere preceded any regulation of those relations between individual members of those

groups. Group marriage has been found among many classes of peoples who practise polyandry in Tibet, India, and Ceylon. It is said that it has arisen as a combination of polygamy and polyandry. The same may be inferred from facts that in both Tibet and India polyandry is much more prevalent than group marriage, that the latter occurs there side by side with polyandry and that the occasional combination of polygamy with polyandry, when the circumstances permit it and make it convenient, is easy to explain, whereas no satisfactory explanation is given for the opinion that polyandry has developed out of an earliest stage of group marriage.

According to Linton, group marriage is so rare that its existence has been questioned. It cannot be denied that certain societies recognise and permit an arrangement by which a group of men and women live together as spouses.

LEVIRATE

The custom of marrying the deceased brother's wife is called levirate. It is a widespread custom and sociologists opine that it was a remnant of polyandry and that it was practised under a polyandric regime. Where women were regarded as property, they were inherited like other possessions of property. In many cases, the brother or in default of him the nearest relative was expressly stated to have the widow; and if he did not marry, he might have the guardianship over her.

Levirate is practised by the Malayarayans and the Kanikkars of Travancore. It is in vogue among the Izhuvans, Thandans, Valans, Panans, Kaniyans, Pulayas and Parayas. It is very widespread among most of the races of the world at some time or other. It has been thought peculiar to the Jews. The code of Manu imposes the levirate even on the brother of a betrothed man who dies, for the purpose of continuing the lineage. The object of the legal concept is to give posterity to the deceased brother by furnishing him with a son who could perform for him the offering of the manes. There is a tendency at present for the decline of the custom in Kerala as also in some districts of the Madras Presidency.

Sororate

Sororate is defined as a form of marital alliance in which several sisters in a family are all regarded as the wives of the man who marries the eldest of them. When the two customs are taken together, they point to a prevalence of marriage between a group of husbands as brothers and a group of wives as sisters. Frazer thinks that the two customs are traceable to a common source in the form of group marriage, but Westermarck does not agree with this view. The two customs are found complementary among the Ūrālis, the Ullātans, and the Mannans.

Widow Marriage

Widow marriage is permitted among primitive tribes. Where it is allowed, the general rule in that the deceased husband's brother takes her as his wife. This is true of the Kanikkar, the Muthuvans, the Mannan, and the Ullātan. Marriage with the elder brother of the deceased husband is found among the Malapulayas and the Malayarayans.

From 1000-300 B. C. re-marriage of widows was fairly common. But later on, such a marriage came to be considered incompatible with virtue and was almost unknown except among the lower castes.

Marriage Ceremonies

Besides the usual exchange of clothes and tying of *tāḷi* (the marriage badge), the commonest of marriage ceremonies is eating and drinking together. The Karavazhi Pulaya bridegroom and bride sit facing east on a mat. Food is served on a leaf in front. The bridegroom gives a ball of rice to the bride. She in turn gives one to him which he eats. Among the Malapantarams of Pathanapuram, the bride's father joins the right hand of the bride to the left hand of the bridegroom, and says "I hand over my daughter to you. Take care of her." The couple are seated on a mat when four balls of rice are brought on a leaf by the bridegroom's sister. The bride hands over two balls of rice to the bridegroom which he eats; he then gives two balls of rice to his wife which she eats. This mutual innoculation by food is the

strongest of all ties and breaks the most important of sexual taboos, that against eating together. Each gives to the other part of himself and receives from the other a part of him. This effects union by assimilating the one to the other, so as to produce somewhat of identity of substance. When the act is done, its sacramental character is intensified. Again the rudimentary ceremonies like joining of hands publicly have according to Malinowski, some inherent force and an importance as great as sanctions. It is a ceremonial pre-representation of the actual union in marriage, assisting the union by making it previously and, as it were objectively.

Among the Kanikkar of Kottur one of the modes of mutual contact is the pressing together of the heads of the pair. The couple are seated on a mat, and rice and curry are served on a plantain leaf. Then two women take hold of the bride's head and press it seven times against her husband's shoulders. This over, the bridegroom takes a small quantity of rice and curry, and puts it seven times into the mouth of his wife.

Among the Malayarayans, the couple are seated on a mat after the usual exchange of cloths and tying of *tāḷi*. The bride's brother then gives her a betel leaf which she tears into two. She then changes hand and is then asked to give one half to her lover. She then chews one half. They are asked to spit in the same spittoon. The chewing of betel constitutes the essence of marriage. The couple then eat off the same leaf. [*Cf. Bhūma*] Among the Beta Kurubas of Coorg there is exchange of betels and nuts which concludes the nuptials. The chewing of betel leaves by the couple constitutes the essence of marriage among the Minihasas of the Celebes and the Balans.

The Muthuvans have another interesting custom. Marriage takes place in the evening in the bride's hut, when the parents of the girl cannot be the spectators of the ceremony. The bridegroom presents among other things a comb of golden bamboo to the bride which forms the essential part of the ceremony. It is always worn by a woman above the knotted hair on the back.

This custom prevails among the Mannans. The wearing of the comb is found among the Kadars of the Cochin State, the Semangs of the Malaya Peninsula, the Sakais of Perak, and the Oraon of Chota Nagpur. It is remarkable that the distribution of the comb follows the distribution of the bamboo.

ADULTERY

The chastity of women is highly valued. Any breach of chastity used to be very severely punished. Among the Kanikkar of Kulathupuzha, it used to be the custom that, if a man committed adultery, his legs were tied up to a branch of a tree. Straw was spread over the ground and it was smoked. The man's body was swung to and fro and he was given twenty five lashes. The woman was given fifteen lashes. The Kanikkars of Kottur tied up 101 twigs of tamarind into one and the adulterer was given one lash with it. It was considered equivalent to 101 lashes.

The Malapulayas tie up the guilty man and woman to a *mullu-murukhu* tree which is called *vambamaram*. Both are given twelve lashes with a twig of tamarind. Formerly if a Paliyan committed incest, the offence was heard by the village council, which punished the culprit by being kept in stocks for a day. This is now given up.

MARRIAGE AMONG THE DRAVIDIANS

The bulk of the population of Kerala are the Dravidians who are not governed by the s'ăstraic Hindu Law of marriage. With them marriage is not a religious duty, the violation of which is blasphemy. Only the Brahmins call upon marriage as a religious duty.

The selection of persons for marriage is guided by two rules: first that they must be outside the family, and secondly, they must be within the caste. The families constituting a clan are related to one another by community of pollution. Marriage witnin the clan in prohibited. Among the clans there are some which maintain equality of social standing with one another. The only socially valid marriages are those in which the parties are of equal social standing or one in which the bridegroom belong s to a clan superior

to that to which the bride belongs. In all other cases, the union entails social stigma upon the reputation and dignity of the family.

Among the high caste Dravidians, the Nayars, marriage is hypergamous, while among the lower castes, it is endogamous. A Nayar is allowed to form a matrimonial alliance with a woman of his own subdivision or one lower in the social scale than himself; but the woman-kind is prevented from exercising the same liberty. According to usage, a Nayar woman consorting with a man of the higher caste follows the hair, purifies the blood and raises the progeny in social estimation. By cohabiting with a man of lower caste, clan or sub-division, she would be guilty of *pratiloma* and if the difference of caste is so great, she would be turned out of the family to prevent the whole family from being boycotted. Marriage is endogamous among the low caste Sudras. Among them it is strictly prohibited even in the case of persons belonging to the same family or whose relationship cannot be traced to its origin. A man cannot marry the sister of his deceased wife nor from her family. The above marriage customs are applicable to the Izhavas also. The best form of marriage among them is where a man marries the daughter of his maternal uncle.

Dowry Marriages

Dowry Marriages are universal among Brahmans and are becoming more popular among the Nayars, Izhavas and Vellalas. Among them, girls in well-to-do families are sought after by educated young men in view of their share of family properties. The practice of parents procuring husbands for their daughters either by payment in cash or by meeting the expenses of their higher education in Indian or foreign universities is also coming into vogue among the Nayars and other communities.

Forms of Marriage

There are two forms of marriage, the *thā!i kattu kalyāṇam* and the *sambandham.* It is the duty of a Nayar mother to arrange a ceremonial marriage for each daughter before puberty. The ceremony is brief, simple and inexpensive, the essential part being the tying of the bridal necklace round the neck of the girl.

The ceremonial bridegroom may be a complete stranger. He acquires no marital rights, goes out of the marriage afterwards completely and probably never sees the girl again. Later on, the girl manages her own matrimonial affairs at her own discretion. The matrimonial tie is called *sambandham* which may be a life-long monogamous marriage or of a very temporary alliance. *Thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* is performed before a girl attains puberty while *sambandham* is celebrated after a girl attains maturity; and the omission or neglect of the former would place her and her family under a ban; for it is considered a religious impurity for a girl to attain puberty before the performance of the ceremony. There is a tendency for these restrictions being over-looked now-a-days. There is no officiating priest in attendence, no formula to be repeated. Under the stress of modern civilisation and as a result of work by social reformers, the Nayars and the Izhavas have practically given up *thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* or combined it with *sambandham*.

There are certain customs which go to show that it was once a real marriage and that circumstances compelled certain communities to resort to *sambandham* and retain the other as a relic of an earlier form. Among the Nayars, it is imperative that the boys who officiate as bridegrooms at the *thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* should belong to the same sub-caste as the girls. In recent times, boys of higher castes such as Brahmins and Thirumalpads have also been permitted to perform the function in North Travancore. It has always been the practice that boys and girls taking part in the *thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* ceremony should be of the same sub-caste. Strict endogamy was thus insisted on in the form of marriage. The Nayars were formerly a military class. The loss of population caused by warfare depleted their members and consequently it must have become impossible for girls to get suitable husbands, if selections were confined to a limited circle of their own sub-caste. The necessity therefore arose for looking for suitors from among the other sub-castes also. The community evidently sanctioned the custom, but insisted that even though the men and women thus united may remain as husband and wife, they should not break

the taboo on inter-dining. Restriction on endogamy was relaxed, but restriction on inter-dining continued to be strictly enforced. That *thāḷi kattu kalyaṇām* was a real form of marriage is further corroborated by the fact that even in recent times, especially in South Travancore, when a man who officiated as a bridegroom to a girl died, the latter was considered to be under pollution for three days. Such a custom would not have come into existence if *thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* did not confer true relationship of husband and wife on the man and woman. Circumstantial evidence goes to show that *thāḷi kattu kalyāṇam* was the real marriage at one time, but when *sambandham* had to be resorted to for widening the field of selection of husbands, it degenerated into a mock marriage and became a relic of an ancient custom.

The prevalence of *Marumakkatayam* which recognises the supremacy of women has made the women more self-reliant and self-dependant than the women of *Makkatayam* communities. The rapid progress made in female education during the last three decades has strengthened the spirit of self-reliance of women. All these causes contribute to the unique position that Kerala occupies in India in regard to the marital condition of women.

POLYGAMY

In Kerala, polygamy is looked upon with disfavour by the respectable classes. Even in the case of tribes and castes in which polygamy is not tabooed, the large majority of men are content with one wife. Among Nayars, polygamy is now prohibited by law. With the spread of education, polygamy is practically dying out. A monogamic union is better fitted for the cultivation of love than a polygamous one. It is said to be highly favourable for the preservation of love in old age. At the best, says Vatsayana, a man can only please one woman physically mentally, and spiritully. Therefore the man who enters into marriage relations with more than one woman voluntarily courts unhappiness and misery.

The Madras Legislative Assembly has passed a Bill in 1948 to prevent bigamy. It is claimed that it makes a great advance in Hindu Society. For the actual implementation of monogamy, divorce is also provided for.

POLYANDRY.

South India is a great centre for polyandry. Its occurrence among the pre-Dravidian population has already been described. Among the Dravidian population, fraternal polyandry prevails among the Kammalans. It implies no prenuptial freedom. The husbands are brothers and they live with the wife in her family. Among the Kallans of Madura, a woman is said to be the wife of two, six, eight, or ten husbands who are all regarded as fathers of the children. The Kaniyans admit that fraternal polyandry was formerly common among them, but this has now died out. It is generally believed that fraternal polyandry once prevailed among the Krishnavakakkars of Travancore. The Nayars are cited as a conspicuous example of polyandrous marriages.

As to the present existence or non-existence of polyandry, Mateer refers to an instance of six brothers keeping two women, four husbands to one and two to the other. Gopala Panikkar says that to enforce social edict among the Nayars, the Brahmins made use of the powerful weapon of their aristocratic ascendancy in the country, and the Nayars readily submitted to the Brahmin ascendancy. Then it came about that the system of concubinage so freely indulged in by the Brahmins with the Nayar women obtained such firm hold in the country that it has been strengthened by the lapse of time. At present, there are families especially in the interior, who look upon it as an honour to be thus united to Brahmins. But a reaction has now set in against this feeling and Brahmin alliances are invariably looked down upon in respectable Nayars tarwads.

It is said that the military organisation of the Nayars prevented them from living the ordinary life of husband and father of a family. Although it gives us the probable explanation of the unusual character of polyandrous habits, it hardly accounts for such habits in full. The advantage which the Nayar derived from this source is that "one who hath not the means to maintain a wife may have a third part of one, and the cost of her maintenance is only in this proportion."

Dr. Kunjan Pillai considers that the Nayar community has been wrongly accused of being polyandrous by several oriental and western scholars. "The inference is based on an imperfect appraisement of the real state of affairs. In the northern parts of Travancore a wife never used to leave her house and live with her husband. In the south the husband took the wife to live with him to his house. In a *marumakkatayam* house-hold, the mother and her children, brothers and sisters and other relations in the female line live together. There is no objection to the wife of an elder brother moving freely with his younger brothers. It was the habit of the married man living with his wife and unmarried brothers in the house and the privilege of free social intercourse which the women enjoy with their husband's younger brothers that led to the inference that fraternal polyandry was prevalent among the Nayars. Sexual jealousy is as strong among them as in any other civilized community."

At the present day, enlightened opinion in the community is extremely reluctant to admit of any survival of the polyandrous customs of their ancesters, but acknowledge that a trace of it is retained in the relations between brothers. "The wife of the brother", says K. M. Panikkar, "is looked upon as a person to whom one could openly, though not legitimately, pay court, and any favour short of sexual relationship which she confers on the brothers is allowed by public opinion. All the brothers treat her half as sister and half as wife." Marriage customs among the Nayars such as the above have now become almost obliterated in conformity with prevalent ideas and modern economic conditions.

Social Condition of Women

It has been said that the social position of women is one of the truest ways of measuring the height of a peoples' culture. In Kerala the *marumakkatayam* system has always recognised the supermacy of woman. She has as much right in the tarwad properties as any other male member of the tarwad, and is therefore on an equal footing with him. No doubt, in recent times, the influence of the woman has waned on account of the unauthorised assertion of authority by the man and the mismanagement of the common properties by the *Karnavan.* These

disintegrating causes are now contributing to the break-up of the *marumakkatayam* system. But during the period of transition the woman is gaining her economic independence as in the West where equality of the sexes in all walks of life has been established. She refuses to be a slave to the other sex. The high degree of education attained by women and the liberal policy pursued by the Government in the matter of appoinments to State service and representation in political institutions without distinction of sex has contributed not a little to make the women of the country self-reliant and self-dependant. The phenomenal progress that women have made in education, the economic independence they are gaining and the political consciousness that has been awakened in them have begun to act as a brake on their desire to enter into matrimonial bondage. Some of them prefer to remain single, earning their livelihood by their own labours. Modern couples have become money conscious whether rich or poor. It may be well to remember in this connection the views of His Excellency C. Rajagopala Chari, as the Governor-General of India: "Let Girls remember that knowledge is not an end in itself. As soon as they get the requisite of satisfactory minimum knowledge, they must marry and look after their families."

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NYĀYA BHĀSKARA OF ANANTĀRYA

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(Continued from Volume XXXVI Pages, 216.)

It is stated as follows: 'In our own school (*i.e.* the advaitic school), the major term is only taken to be of that form which is capable of being denoted by unreality. It is stated that only the counter-entity of the negation of the type stated above is not of that variety (*i e.* it is not unreal). Then at the time of the cognition of the absolutely real nature in the counter-entity, the cognition of the counter-entity of the negation of the type stated above will not be denoted to be one of unreal nature.

Even then the clause, 'Subsisting in that which is destructible' is taken to be of that type (*i.e.* of an unreal nature) because in the cognition of that which is destructible there will be the cognition of the real nature and because also that which is destructible is not opposed to that which is of the absolutely real nature and this form (of absolute reality) is not sublated upon (as false) by cognition.

Here the others have mentioned two alternatives, namely, 'Is the negation of the world, that is related to unreality (1) One of practical reality or (2) one of absolute reality?' The first alternative is not correct. The negation of the world is taken to be one of practical reality. Then the negation of the type stated above is apprehended to be one of absolute negation when the inferential reasoning that is under discussion now is considered. There is also the expectation that in the world, that is the counter-entity of the negation of the type stated above, there is the negation of that negation (*i.e.* the negation of the world). Hence *i.e.* the word) pervades a grater (sphere than that of the counter-entity of its negation). As the world is proved by inferential reasoning to be unreal by the apprehension of the knowledge, namely, 'The negation of its negation which is the attribute of the *Brahman*' its (*i.e.* the world's) negation, which is the attribute of the *Brahman* pervades a greater (sphere than the counter-entity of the negation of the negation).

The universal pervasion (is explained thus): It is proved that the negation of its own negation, which is the attribute of another (object), pervades a greater sphere than its own negation which is the attribute of that (*i. e.* the same object). It is further explained thus. In silver there is the erroneous perception that it is not silver. Subsequently by the process of perception, the knowledge, namely, 'This is not 'not silver' is produced. The silverness is apprehended to be the negation of its negation, that is the attribute of silver, and it pervades a greater sphere; because there is the desire to include an entity that pervades a greater sphere than the entity of an absolutely unreal nature, that subsists in the negation of silverness that is the attribute of silver. Thus when the world is taken into consideration, its negation pervades a lesser sphere and so unreality becomes related to the negation of an entity that pervades a lesser sphere. It should not be argued thus: The older school have not accepted the existence of absolute negation in the substratum, namely, 'The negation that subsists prior to the destruction.' Then the invariable concomitance, that is explained above will become fallacious, when the pot of an absolutely unreal nature, that subsists in the broken pieces of the pot after the pot is destroyed, is considered. The absolute negation of the pot is not found to exist in those broken pieces of the pot (stated above). In the pot of the absolutely unreal nature, that subsists in those broken pieces of the pot, the knowledge of the negation of its negation which is the attribute of that (the other object) is apprehended. Yet it does not pervade a greater sphere than its own negation that is the attribute of that (*i.e.* the other object). Therefore in order to ward off the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* (*i.e.* the definition falls short of requirements), the cause, namely, 'Though there is not the apprehension of its own negation, (the negation of its own negation), is alone apprehended,' is to be included in the definition Yet in the broken pieces of the pot after the pot is destroyed, there is the apprehension of the negation of either the pot or its absolute negation through the process of perception while the negation of the pot only is not apprehended. Thus the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* does not arise; because there is not the

apprehension of only the negation of the pot. This (negation of the negation of the pot) is apprehended as the negation of the negation of the pot with the qualification, 'the non-apprehension of the negation of the pot.' Thus there is the apprehension of the negation of the world in the *Brahman*; because of the inferential reasoning relating to unreality through which is apprehended the negation of the negation of the world. Because also there is the scriptural text, namely, 'Here there are not many.' and the world is not related to the substances denoted by the word, 'only' that is included in this clause (the negation of the negation) does not pervade a greater sphere than its own negation. Hence the category of unreality is proved.

It is not so. Even though the word, 'only' is included in the clause it is not possible to ward off the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* in the pot of an absolutely unreal nature subsisting in the broken pieces of the the pot after the pot is destroyed. In those broken pieces there is not the apprehension of the negation of the pot; but there is the apprehension of the negation of the negation of the pot. Thus by the process of perception is apprehended (the knowledge of the form) namely, the negation of the pot is not found in the broken pieces of the pot. Thus in the knowledge of the form, namely, 'The negation of *ākāsa* is found in the *Brahman*' and it is proved that unreality is apprehended by the process of perception of only the negation of *ākāsa*. Through this proof is apprehended the negation of its own negation, although there is not the apprehension of its negation in the *Brahman*. This proof is made applicable to *ākāsa*, etc. that belong to the world. Therefore it is not possible to word off (the fact, namely) that it pervades a greater sphere by considering that the negation of *ākāsa* is found in the *Brahman*. The *probandum* of the inferential reasoning relating to unreality has for its distinguishing characteristic the negation of *ākāsa* taken in its individual capacity. Though at times the cognition apprehending unreality is apprehended, the distinguishing characteristic of *ākāsa* will be of the form of joint cognition and here there is no proof that the inferential reasoning of the type stated above will be produced by the joint cognition of the type stated above.

It should not be argued thus: The two mistakes stated above will not arise by accepting the invariable concomittance to be this, namely, it (*i.e.* the invariable concomittance) is other than the accurate knowledge which is taken to be the attribute subsisting in its negation, when the possessor of attributes is indicated to have subsisted in that (same object). Thus it (*i. e.* knowledge) pervades a greater sphere because there is the desire to include its negation subsisting in that (same object) and because there is the accurate knowledge, namely, its negation has the attributes of the broken pieces of the pot. When (the idea of) the pot subsists in the broken pieces of the pot and *ākāsa*, etc. become the object of accurate knowledge, namely, 'Its negation is the attribute of the *Brahman*' because also (the idea of the pot subsisting in broken pieces of the pot) is not related to that (knowledge) other than the accurate knowledge of the type stated above.

It is not so. If it were so the invariable concomitance of the type stated above will not become proved. In silver there is the erroneous perception, namely, 'this is not silver' Subsequently there will be the accurate knowlede, namely, 'this is not other than not silver.' There silverness is not other than the accurate knowledge, namely, 'Its negation is the attribute of silver'. In silver there is the accurate knowledge of the negation of silver whose counter-entity has for its chaiactertic some other relationship and some other form.

It should not be argued thus: The mistake does not arise when the rule is taken to be this: 'suppose there is the accurate knowledge of that (object) whose characteristic is the negation, having for its distinguishing characterstic its own negation through that relationship subisting in itself. Then that attribute pervades a greater sphere, because there is the desire to include the negation subsisting in itself through that (same) relationship subsisting in that (same object) and because in silverness the accurate knowledge of silver having for its attribute the negation of the negation whose distinguishing characteristic is silverness, though the inseparable inherence (i. e. *Samavāya*) pervades a greater sphere than the

negation of silverness through the intimate relationship (*i.e. Samavāya*) that subsists in silver.

It is not so. If it were so the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* (*i. e.* the definition falls short of requirements) arises in potness of an absolutely unreal nature existing in the pot, and when (the idea of the pot) subsists in the broken pieces of the pot in the type stated above. Here (in this case) there is the accurate knowledge that the broken pieces of the pot has for its attribute the negation of the negation through the relationship of *Samavāya* (*i.e.* inseparable inherence) that subsists in itself. Yet it does not pervade a sphere greater than the negation of the pot through the relationship of *Samavāya* that subsists in the broken pieces of the pot.

It is not possible to ward off the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* of the type stated above, even if the word, 'only' is introduced. Here too there is the accurate knowledge of the broken pieces of the pot, having as its attribute the negation, whose distinguishing characteristic is potness through the relationship of *Samavāya* (*i.e.* inseparable inherence). But in that potness there does exist (knowledge). It (*i. e.* that it pervades a greater sphere) will not become proved in that school, because there is the accurate knowledge, namely, 'the pot is not found to exist in the broken pieces of the pot through the relationship of *Samavāya* (*i.e.* intimate relationship)'. The older school (of logicians) have accepted destruction to be the counter-entity having as its distinguishing characteristics the common attributes. But (they) have not accepted the counter-entity through that relationship (of *Samavāya*). Therefore the invariable concomitance that is to be accepted is this: 'That form, whose accurate knowledge has for its attribute its negation, subsists in the substratum, namely, the counter-entity that is (no other than) itself, that pervades a greater sphere than itself and here the fallacy of *Vyabhichāra* does not arise in that pot. In those broken pieces of the pot the absolute negation of the pot through that relationship of *Samavāya* (or intimate relationship) and the pot are of absolutely real nature. The destruction the pot does pervade a greater sphere than the negation of that pot. The old school have accepted that the

counter-entity of the absolute negation of the pot is one of three (things) namely, (1) the pot, (2) destruction and (3) antecedent negation. Thus too, of the negation of the world it is stated as follows: The accurate knowledge is that the *Brahman* has for its attribute its own negation in the same way as it has the attribute of the negation of the world. Its negation pervades a greater sphere than itself. Thus it is not possible to get over the difficulty, namely, 'The world is one of an absolutely real nature. The view of that section that states that the negation of the world is of an absolutely real nature is not correct; because non-duality will be destroyed (through such statements).

It should not be argued thus. The non-duality will not be destroyed; because that (negation of the world) is the essential nature of the *Brahman*. It is not so. Because negation is taken to be of the form of negation with all its qualifications. Thus it does not become the essential nature of the *Brahman*. It is useless to accept that the negation only (without the qualifications) is the essential nature of the *Brahman*.

It should not be argued thus. In order to break the opposition between existence and negation, it is essential that they (*i.e.* existence and negation) should pervade different spheres and the negation with all its qualifications will not become one of absolutely real nature. Hence that (negation) having only that form (without the qualifications) is taken to be identical with that (negation).

It is not so. The negation is opposed to the counter-entity; because it has the form of absolute negation, whose counter-entity is denoted by particular (objects). Therefore in order to break off the opposition, it is essential that there should be an existence distinct from the counter-entity; because it has the form of absolute negation. By accepting that (form of absolute negation), it will become useless to accept an existence distinct from the form of pure *Brahman*. Hence it is useless to accept the negation that is the essential nature of the *Brahman*. Thus the major term is taken to be the counter-entity, whose distinguishin

characteristics are the same attributes of negation that subsist in a substratum, whose distinguishing characteristics are the same attributes. Then the illustration does not fit into the definition of the major term. In the substratum, whose distinguishing characteristic is the shell-silver, its negation is accepted to be of an absolutely real nature. Yet the negation having for its distinguishing characteristic, the shell-silver, has not been accepted; because the demonstrated conclusion is this: 'The negation is apprehended in the three times (*i.e.* past, present and future) as stated in the sentences, namely,' 'It was not in existence. It is not in existence. It will not be.' Its counter-entity is the silver in its essential nature found in the market and it is of the form of an absolutely real nature or of an absolutely unreal nature.

It should not be argued thus. As regards the knowledge that is sublated upon as false, namely,' 'This was not in existence. This is not in existence. This will not be,' the silver which is found in the market and which is of an absolutely real nature is apprehended to be the counter-entity in its essential nature, yet the erroneous perception and the knowledge that is sublated upon as false happen to be different substrata that are related to different objects and there is the apprehension of the negation that is not connected with it (*i.e.* the knowledge that is sublated as false). The shell-silver is not known to be identical with the silver of the type of practical reality. Therefore only that which is absolutely unreal is negated upon in its essential nature.

It should not be argued thus: That the counter-entity of the negation with regard to time and space in which it is cognised is the silver in its essential nature, that is found in the market or the silver of an absolutely real nature that is perceived mentally. It is opposed to what the *ācārya* (*i.e.* S'ankarācārya), has stated.

This is not so. The meaning of what the *ācārya* has stated is this: 'The counter-entity is the silver of an absolutely unreal nature that is perceived mentally; because it is identical with the silver that is found in the market and that is of an absolutely real

nature. This expression (*i.e.* with regard to time and space) is used because there is the indifference due to the fact that this (counter-entity) is in its essential nature or is of an absolutely real nature. It should not be argued thus: The silver is mentally perceived when the sentence, 'The silver found in the market is explained.' (This silver found in the market) is apprehended to be identical with the silver of practical reality. Hence it will be useless to introduce this sentence, because there is no rule that the silver is apprehended to be identical with that which is perceived before and that (*i.e.* the sentence) is included in order to explain that it (*i.e.* silver) is apprehended to be identical with the silver of an absolutely real nature. It is not so. In the erroneous perception, that is mentally perceived, namely. 'This is silver' it will be useless to accept that the identity with the silver of the type of practical reality manifests itself.

It should not be argued thus: Suppose there is the desire, namely, Let me have the true silver. Here in order to have this desire it is essential to introduce the clause, namely, 'That its identity manifests itself'.

It is not so. In the silver, that is mentally perceived, the indicating mark, namely 'silverness' subsists in the silver of the type of practical reality. This could be applied to shell also in the same way as it could be applied to silver. Therefore when the silver of the type of practical reality is mentally perceived, it will be useless to accept the superimposition of identity; because there will be the desire to have that (silver), though there is the absence of that knowledge, namely, ('Let me have the true silver').

It should not be argued thus: Silverness, etc. that subsist in practical reality are acepted to be received mentally. Through mental perception the effect, namely, silver, etc. of the type of practical reality are introduced. In mental perception is produced the relationship of silverness that is perceived mentally but yet it is essential to superimpose the identity of the mentally perceived (silver), when there is the desire to have that (silver) with all the qualifications of silverness, etc. that have been experienced in practical reality.

It is not so. Silverness, etc. that subsist in silver, etc. of the type of practical reality are excluded from being that, which is mentally perceived but as regards the knowlede that apprehends with all their attributes, the correct (knowledge) of the attribute, namely, silverness, etc. will become the (subject matter) of the middle term that is common to both the erroneous perception and the correct perception and the right knowledge of silver possessed of a few attributes only and is opposed to that (knowledge) which is common to erroneous perception. As regards the inferential reasoning relating to silver, etc. the deduction that the subject possesses the middle term is common to the knowledge of the erroneous perception. There it is not possible to have only one middle term. Thus only the conglomeration of the causes having as its qualification, practical reality, is accepted to be co-extensive with that which produces the fruits thereof because it is possible to ward off the effect produced by silver, etc. of the type of practical reality through mental perception.

It should not be argued thus. As regards that, which is common to silver and erroneous perception, the identity with silver of the type of practical reality manifests itself. Though the silver etc. of the type stated above is excluded from mental perception, yet in that erroneous perception, there is the cognizability relating to the silver of only the type of practical reality. Thus it is possible to reconcile it with only one middle term.

It is not so. The silver of the type of practical reality is not near at hand, its identity does not manifest itself in erroneous perception. You have not accepted the subsequent knowledge derived from an antecedent one. If it manifests itself as a subsequent knowledge derived from an antecedent one, than the fallacy of *anyathā khyāti* arises.

It should not be argued thus : Suppose there is the mental perception at the time subsequent to its (*i.e.* silver's) production. Then the mistake, namely, 'that it exists at a distance' arises. Then it is seen that there is a super-imposition of identity on practical reality and (this practical reality), though it has not a substratum,

subsists near at hand, though the silver of the type of practical reality is not near at hand, there does remain now at hand the erroneous perception, which is of the form of remembrance.

It is not so. That which is unreal is superimposed on identity in one place but in another place it is improbable that it is superimposed on the (same) identity. At those places where those that pervade different spheres manifest themselves as identically the same, there is the rule that they are related to ignorance, which is their material cause. In the case of the object relating to the knowledge alone that sets aside or discards *cognition*, *ignorance*, which is its material cause, has been superimposed on identity. In the production of the silver of the type of practical reality, there is the apprehension of the knowledge of the form of remembrance, namely, 'This is silver'. Thus too it is useless to assume the production of silver, that cannot be explained in any way. There is the desire to have it (*i. e.* the silver) because of the two kinds of knowledge, namely, apprehension and remembrance. The *Prabhakarās* have accepted the two cognizabilities relating to these two kinds of knowledge, as being reciprocally determined by each other. Hence it is not right to assume that what the *ācārya* has stated means another thing. Thus it is not possible to get over the difficulty, namely, 'There is then the maiming of the limb of the middle term (of the syllogistic reasoning) of the type stated above.

(*To be continued.*)

REVIEWS

Time and Eternity. By Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. Published by Messrs. Artibus Asiæ, Publishers, Ascona. (Switzerland). Price $ 4.80 or Swiss Francs 20.

ANANDA COOMARASWAMY, the gifted author of this book, was also a well-known figure in the country of his adoption, Boston, U. S. A. and by his death we have lost an Indologist of considerable eminence. The title of the book is taken from Dionysius. In this world of sense it is indeed necessary to examine carefully what time and place are, so that what delights in a part, whether of place or time, may be understood to be far less beautiful than the whole of which it is a portion. The work is a documental exposition of the perennial doctrines as it has been enunciated with fundamental agreement in Hindu, Buddhist, Greek, Christian and Islamic contexts. Time is absolutely continuous only logically but not really divisible into parts. Temporal experience has a past and the future and the so-called present always includes the past or the past and the future. Eternity is the timeless, atomic and self-same Now. From the temporal point of view it is the duration without a beginning or an end or, as it is in itself, the unextended point of view which is Now. Has time had ever a beginning; will it have an end? Is God eternal? What was he before he created or made this World? Can we say it is we who move while the Now is unmoved and only seems to move, as much as the Sun only seems to rise and set because the earth revolves? It is important to remember that in the words of Anaxagoras, "things apparent are the vision of things unseen." The Vedic position is in perfect agreement with the Platonic, which is that things are false (*anṛta*) in the sense that an imitation, though it exists, is not the real thing of which it is an imitation; and with the Christian doctrine as formulated by St. Augustine in *Conf.* 7. 11. and 11. 4.

The Vedic doctrine that the world is the stuff of art (*māyā-maya*) is not a doctrine of illusion but it merely distinguishes the relative reality of the artefact from the greater reality of the Artificer(*mayin, nirmāṇakāra*) in whom the paradigm subsists.

The world is an epiphany; and it is no one's fault but our own if we mistake the things that were made, for the reality after which they were made, the phenomenon itself for that of which phenomena are appearances. Time or *kāla* unites procession, recession and stasis, and by these All This world or universe is united. To the Hopi, for example, time is not cut up into segments which can be measured, like an hour, a day, or a year, but it is rather conceived as a duration, in which the Law is being fulfilled.

Time is Brahma who has two forms: Time and Timeless. That which is prior to the Sun is the Timeless (*akāla*) and partless (*akala*); but that which begins with the Sun is the time that has parts (*sakala*), and its form is that of the Year ..... Prajapati......Self. (*Maitri. Up.* 6. 2). It is folly to say of the world that it 'is'; and neither 'I' a substance, since 'it' can only be seen from an instant; how can the words 'I am omniscient' hold good for the I, etc. that exists for a moment only? Atomicity and immensity are attributed simultaneously to the ultimate reality in which all extremes meet and implies a total and omipresence, and the coincidence in eternity of whatever is everlasting with whatever is Now.

Early Buddhism emphasised the inconstancy and the extreme brevity of life under any conditions, in a word, its mortality in the sense that "all change is a dying" and asserts unequivocally the unreality of 'beings' and of "self" although both are permissible terms when postulated merely for practical, everyday purposes. That there is "no momemt in which the river rests" shows clearly that time is not to be thought of as "made of" a succession of stops, but as a continuum; the indivisible moment is immanent in time, but not a part of time; just as for Aristotle "time is not composite of atomic Nows, and more than any other magnitude is made of atoms" Stability is the peculiar property of enternity. Men saw the two things, body and soul, pondered them, investigated both of them, and found that each is mutable in man. The body is mutable in its various ages, in its corruption, its ailments, its reflections and its defections, its life, its death. They passed to the soul, which they

certainly comprehended as being the better, and also wondered at as being invisible. The answer in terms of time is that the Buddha identified with the Dhamma, must be, like the Dhamma, "simple" and by the same token "timeless."

When discussing Time and Eternity in Greek contexts the author refrains from entering into any long account of Greek atomism as a whole since it appears that a distinction must be made between the physical atoms of which bodies may by a composite, and the atomic time that divides and unites periods of time from and to one another. Physical atoms must have some dimension if any thing is to be made of them: but the time-atom is zero. Before Aristotle, Parmenides has set forth in the clearest possible terms the doctrine that 'that which *is*' and being Now, is other than the things that only seem to be and since they come into being and pass away, cannot be said to *be*. For Plato, the world was made by Zeus according to a self-same, stable living paradigm, not generated but eternal. Philo describes the created world as consisting of an almost infinite series of opposites held together in harmony by the very creative impulse or agent which had originally separated them out from primitive and unformed matters by a series of bisections *i.e.* delimitations or measurements. All things on earth are overtaken by destruction for without destruction there can be no origination. The things that come into being must needs arise from those that are destroyed: and those that come into being must be destroyed if origination is to go on. But the things that come into being out of destruction must be false because they become different at different times. Plutarch holds "nor is it possible to lay hold twice of any mortal substance in the same state; by sharpness and swiftness of the change in it there 'comes dispersion and again combination' or that not at another time nor later but at the same instant it both takes its place and leaves it and it 'comes and goes.'." For Plotinus for whom "there are no atoms; all body is divisible endlessly", time and motion are continuous and time and imitation of eternity, is the life of the soul as she passes from one phase of activity or experience to

another. On the other hand, Eternity, in the last analysis, is identical with God, "is a life changelessly motionless and ever holding the universal content in actual presence; not this now and now that other, but always all......self-same, for ever in the present now......whole, in the full sense that nothing whatever is absent from it."

Islam regards time as made up of now's which means that time is made up of great many times which cannot be further sub-divided. When Allah creates a material atom he creates in it what accidents he wills. When an accident is created it passes at once; then Allah creates another accident of the same kind...... he is absolutely the only agent in existence but he creates in the mind the supposed actor an accepting as his own of his supposed act ......Only Allah holds together the whole stream of existence of the world. Allah is the only reality. There are very few metaphysical doctrines in Islam that could not be very plausibly derived from Vedic or Buddhist sources. Dr. Coomaraswamy in considering Meister Eckhart's words, "God is creating the world now, this instant," thinks that it might be said by any Sufi but is almost certainly not of Buddhist origin. He proceeds and says "in fact, the whole doctrine of 'time and eternity' in Sufi, Islamic and Christian contexts could have been derived from Platonic-Aristotelian sources." Historical studies have a certain value in that the universality of fundamental ideas can be demonstrated as against those who think of them as having been the inventions of those who enunciate; for the rest, the literary history of ideas is of ultimate value only in so for as it can contribute to the answering of the question. Is such and such a doctrine true, and How can it best be disentangled from individual heretical misinterpretations, and so rightly understood. Platonic tradition persists with St. Augustine and Boethius in the beginnings of the Middle Ages.

In Christianity, the significance of the present is asserted by the words of Christ, "Let the dead bury their dead" and "take no thought for the morrow". "Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump... the dead

shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall all be changed. Time is one, not because it is a number, for time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the things numbered. God is 'ever' because 'ever' is with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference between the 'Now' which is our present, and the Now which is the divine present, that our now connotes changing time and sempiternity; while God's now abiding, unmoving, and self-subsistent makes eternity. God beholds those future things which proceed from free-will not as future but as present and freedom to will or nill is no more impugned by this present inspection or onsight that are the acts of a man in a distant field controlled by our looking on at what he is doing. Freedom to will or nill is the work of reason. God is creating the whole world now, this instant.

All this symbolism is bound up with the doctrine that equates the person of the severality of Gods and likewise the Justified Deceased with the rays of the intelligible sun. Truth, alike in Brahminism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity is as much as Eternity one of the names of God, and it is only our forgetfulness that makes us need to pray "O, thou who changest not abide with me', as a Sufi might desire to make his *Waqt hāl.* If the eternal bliss of existence is both here and now and timeless, it might be well to see what it feels like here and now before feeling so much afraid of it. Indeed we do not participate in eternity now, perhaps we never shall.

The history of the meanings of the concepts of time and of eternity have been traced admirably in the book. Time is the one in which all things come and go and Eternity in which all stand immutable. We can only accept these established meanings without question, if the integrity of communication is to be preserved; for non-special and non-temporal intuition is the condition of the interpretation of the space-time world itself.

All states of being, seen in principle, are simultaneous in the eternal now and he who cannot escape from the standpoint of temporal succession so as to see all things in their simultaneity is incapable of the least conception of the metaphysical order and in

the unified experience of reality, the whole process of creation from the Primal Covenant to the Resurrection is a single timeless moment of Divine Self-manifestation.

Just as from the centre of a circle all parts of the circumference and all the radii are visible all at once, so the eternal onsight is neither hindsight nor a fore-sight, and in no way conflicts with the determinations nor with free-will. A further consequence is that there remains no opposition between the concepts of gradation and evolution : God is creating the whole world now as much as he ever was or will be and there is an end of the notion that the universe came into being in six days. An end, too, of the modern opposition of science and religion since experimental science is only concerned with serial events taking place in Time and does not pretend to deal with any kind of timeless experience whatever. On the other hand, the philosopher cannot ignore eternity, because it is the timeless point without which Time itself would be inconceivable in terms of past and future, just as space apart from any dimensioned point would be meaningless in terms of here and there ; and of two things, of which one gives its meaning to the other, the first must be the more real and more to be depended upon.

S. S.

Early Monastic Buddhism Vol. II. By Nalinaksha Dutt, M.A., B.L., Ph.D. (Cal.), D. Lit (Lond.) Calcutta Oriental Series No. 30.

THIS work deals with the development of the Buddhistic thought from the time of the Buddha to that of As'ōka. During this period, the Buddhist Council was held on three occasions to settle the disputes that arose among the followers of the Buddha. But the differences could not be dissolved. In the first council, the *Buddhavachanas* were all collected together. The Buddha, gave some latitude to his disciples in the observance of the ethical code etc. No one was appointed the head of the monks, consequently a number of schools, numbering nearly to eighteen arose, each opposing the other. There were disputes even as regards the *Buddha vachanas* themselves. The third council was held at the time of As'ōka. Then attempts were made to propagate the religion. But nothing was done to compose the differences.

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